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FORUM: COMMENT

A Man Lost in the Gray Zone
DAVID LUBAN

The Rudolf Kastner trial was one of the three great scandals that rocked
Israeli party politics in the 1950s (the others were the negotiations with
Germany for Holocaust reparations and the so-called "Lavon affair"). Although Leora Bilsky describes it as an "almost forgotten trial,"l it has not
been forgotten by subsequent writers: it makes an important cameo appearance in Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem; it features prominently in Tom
Segev's The Seventh Million (1991); Yehuda Bauer's Jews for Sale? (1994)
takes pains to refute the charges against Kastner; and it inspired two novels-Amos Elon's Timetable (1980) and Neil Gordon's cerebral thriller The
Sacrifice of Isaac (1995). But the legal opinions have never until now attracted the thought or analysis they warrant, and Bilsky deserves gratitude
for remedying this omission. With admirable insight and ingenuity, Bilsky
focuses on the construction of the legal opinions as a form of literature.
Her reading of Judge Halevi's and Justice Agranat's opinions centers on
the way in which law is driven by metaphor-in Halevi's case, the metaphor of contract; in Agranat's, the metaphor of administrative decision
making. Her article is a major contribution to our understanding of the
Kastner case and to the way that, in a situation of intense moral ambiguity, legal analysis can be predetermined by a choice of metaphors.
I found Bilsky's critique of Halevi's opinion illuminating and accurate,
with a few qualifications that I discuss below. Her analysis of Agranat's
opinion and her own view of Kastner (which closely resembles Agranat's)
raise more doubts. At the end of the day, however, I still find myself unable to answer the two basic questions, Who is Kastner? and How shall we
judge what he did?
I. Leora Bilsky, "Judging Evil in the Trial of Kastner," Law and History Review 19 (2001):
118.
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It seems that everyone has a story to tell about Kastner. For Arendt, "the
strange Mr. Kastner"2 is an emblem of the feckless Judenriite, who turns
out to be morally less interesting than Eichmann, the "devil" to whom
Halevi's opinion says he sold his soul. For Segev, Kastner is a sympathetic figure, deluded perhaps, but ultimately someone enmeshed in the same
Sophie's-Choice-like game that every Israeli rescuer had been playing for
years. The real story for Segev is the politics of the trial itself. Bilsky is
more sympathetic to Kastner's plight than either of these authors, following Agranat and Bauer in viewing Kastner as a resourceful Zionist rescuer
taking a bold but unsuccessful gamble to save Jewish lives. By contrast,
Kastner's persecutors saw him only as a symbol of the moral evil represented by the Mapai (Labor) Party, a self-seeking collaborator with Nazi
evil. But, after pondering all these accounts of the Kastner story, I cannot
escape the suspicion that the man and the choices he made remain fundamentally opaque and inscrutable.
I have three aims in this comment: first, to explain the few hesitations I
have about Bilsky's interpretation; second, to place Bilsky's work in the
historiography of the Kastner case by contrasting it with Arendt's and Segev's accounts; third, to explain why, at the end of the day, I fear that
Kastner himself remains a cipher lost in the gray zone.

I

"The gray zone" is Primo Levi's label for the demimonde of Lager and
ghetto inmates who imitated, collaborated with, or assisted the Nazis in
return for marginally better treatment for themselves or others. They include the kapos in Auschwitz who bullied and brutalized their fellow inmates, the Special Squads who performed the physical labor of the gas
chambers and crematoria, the clerks and helpers and camp administrators
and ghetto bosses. Their motives varied widely: "terror, ideological seduction, servile imitation of the victor, myopic desire for any power whatsoever, even though ridiculously circumscribed in space and time, cowardice, and, finally, lucid calculation .... " Importantly for understanding
Kastner, some were heroes playing a dangerous game of double agency.
And some only thought they were heroes.
Levi believes that we are fully entitled to exonerate or to condemn some
of the inhabitants of the gray zone. But about others, he confesses impotentiajudicandi. Consider the Auschwitz Special Squads-snatched direct2. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in lernsalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, rev. ed. (New
York: Viking. 1963). 197.
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ly from the boxcars, exhausted, bewildered, starving, then placed immediately to work in the crematoria, on pain of instant death (only to be killed
a few months later by their own replacements). Levi pleads as follows: "I
ask that we meditate on the story of the 'crematorium ravens' with pity and
rigor, but that judgment of them be suspended." Consider Chaim Rurnkowski, the bizarre self-anointed "king of the Jews" who ruled at Nazi sufferance over the Lodz ghetto, minting coins with his own image, yet sometimes taking substantial risks on behalf of his "subjects." Levi writes that
man "becomes all the more confused ... the more he is subjected to tensions: at that point he evades our judgment, just as a compass goes wild at
the magnetic pole."3
Levi's effort to probe and chart the gray zone is tremendously important,
but even more important is his very acknowledgment that it exists. Compare his nuanced approach, for example, with the view of Lucy Davidowicz, who categorically asserts that no Jewish leaders ever cooperated or
collaborated with the Nazis. Davidowicz is able to reach this conclusion only
because she identifies collaboration with treason: a collaborator was a Jew
who hoped for a German victory. Yet she, too, acknowledges that, as the
Final Solution took shape, some Jewish leaders tried to buy time by outfitting and supplying the German army and that eventually none of them had
any option except "bargaining with the Devil"-the very phrase that Judge
Halevi hurled at Kastner, borrowed by Davidowicz, obviously with the
Kastner case in mind, to defend the Jewish leadership. Surely, bargaining
with the Devil places them in the gray zone; etymologically, anyone who
worked side-by-side with Nazis col-Iaborated. But Davidowicz refuses to
acknowledge shades of gray. Instead she quotes Zelig Kalmanovich: "'All
are guilty, or perhaps more truly, all are innocent and holy. "'4
By contrast, Levi writes from a sense of two irresistible pressures. On
the one hand is the pressure of the facts themselves, a pressure to withhold
judgment where the moral preconditions of judgment seem so sparse. On
the other hand is the fundamental human need to make sense of morally
significant events by passing judgment on the men and women who, whatever their role, brought them to pass. That is: despite his repeated pleas not
to judge the unjudgeable, Levi understands that remaining agnostic in the
face of evil is a defeat. We need a map of the gray zone. And that is not
just because we have an emotional need to judge the unjudgeable, but also
because not all of its inhabitants are unjudgeable.
3. All the quotations come from Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond
Rosenthal (New York: Vintage, 1988),43,60,64.
4. All passages quoted from Lucy S. Davidowicz, The War against the Jews, 1933-1945
(New York: Bantam, 1975),348,352,353.
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Where in the gray zone do we find Kastner, negotiating for the lives of
his fellow townsmen and relatives, bargaining out Eichmann and Himmler's
insane trucks-for-blood deal, testifying after the war on behalf of his Nazi
bargaining partners? That Kastner belongs in the gray zone seems undeniable; but where he belongs in it, and whether he belongs among those
who can be judged, remains obscure.

II
It was in April and May 1944, mere weeks before the beginning of the Final

Solution in Hungary, that Kastner-a former journalist, a member of the
Labor Zionist organization in Hungary, and vice-president of the Rescue
Committee-negotiated the deal with Eichmann that formed the heart of
the case against him. There are two differing accounts of the deal. Kastner said that it was a Nazi offer to sell six hundred Hungarian Jews-later
bumped to almost 1700-for six million pengo (about $1.6 million), which
the Jewish community succeeded in raising. Eichmann reported the terms
of the deal differently (although this was not known at the time of the
Kastner trial): Kastner, said Eichmann, "agreed to keep the Jews from resisting deportation-and even keep order in the camps--if I would close
my eyes and let a few hundred or a few thousand young Jews emigrate illegally to Palestine. It was a good bargain."5 No matter which version of
the deal is correct-both Eichmann and Kastner had ample motive to lie
if the other's version is true-a total of 1684 Jews, carefully culled to include representatives of all major sections of Hungarian Jewry, were placed
on a train to safety.6 (Borrowing Kastner's own biblical metaphor for the
rescue train, let me label this the "Noah's-ark deal.") Damningly for Kastner, they included almost four hundred from his hometown of Kluj, including several of his relatives. The implication that Kastner had helped Eichmann by deliberately failing to warn the Hungarian Jews of the fate in store
for them, and that he had done so in return for saving "his" 1700 people,
is the most serious accusation against him.
What was it like to negotiate with Eichmann? To get some sense of it,
we may examine a second negotiation that Kastner was involved in, the
trucks-for-blood deal. This story begins with Yoel Brand, a former Communist activist, Zionist, and expert on the underground rescue of Jews.
5. Quoted in Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (N(:w York: New Viewpoints, 1973), 543, from Life, 5 Dec. 1960, 146. The six million pengo figure also comes
from Hilberg. I have not examined the newly released Eichmann memoirs on this episode.
6. Bilsky says 1685 ("Judging Evil," 126), but the sources I have consulted all say 1684.
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Around the time of the "Noah's-ark" deal with Kastner, Eichmann summoned Brand to his office in the Budapest Hotel Majestic and said:
Do you know who I am? I have carried out the Aktionen in the Reich-in
Poland-in Czechoslovakia. Now it is Hungary's tum. I let you come here
to talk business with you. Before that I investigated you-and your people ....
And I have come to the conclusion that you still have resources. So I am ready
to sell you-a million Jews. All ofthem I wouldn't sell you. That much money
and goods you don't have. But a million-that will go. Goods for bloodblood for goods. You can gather up this million in countries which still have
Jews. You can take it from Hungary. From Poland. From Austria. From Theresienstadt. From Auschwitz. From wherever you want. What do you want to
save? Virile men? Grown women? Old people? Children? Sit down-and
talk. 7

As the negotiations proceeded, Eichmann agreed to a piecemeal deal to
demonstrate his honesty ("You think we are all crooks. You hold us for what
you are. Now I am going to prove to you that I trust you more than you
trust me.")-first, one hundred thousand Jews for a thousand trucks, then,
for every additional thousand trucks an additional hundred thousand Jews.
Eichmann told Brand that, as a sign of good faith, he would blow up Auschwitz as soon as the deal was consummated (a blatant lie, as Eichmann
had no authority to do anything of the kind). As a reassurance to the Western Allies, Eichmann added that the trucks would be used only on the eastern front.
That this "deal" was fantasy is obvious, and Brand understood at the time
that the Allies would never tum over ten thousand trucks to their enemy.
Nevertheless, he thought that by keeping negotiations alive he might buy
time for the Hungarian Jews. In mounting urgency, Brand relayed the deal
to Zionist authorities, who in tum communicated it to the British and the
Americans, where it apparently went all the way to the desks of Churchill
and Roosevelt. The result was an ill-fated journey by Brand to Istanbul and
Aleppo, where (as predicted by Irgun agents who forewarned Brand as he
boarded the train to Aleppo) he was promptly arrested by the British and
spirited away to detention in Cairo. From the point of view of the British
and the Americans, the deal represented nothing more than an effort to drive
a wedge into their alliance with Stalin.s (Besides, as one British official in
7. Quoted in Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 724-25, from Alexander Weissberg, Die Geschichte von Yael Brand (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1956).
8. Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 542-44,723-28; Tom Segev, The Seventh
Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: Hill and Wang,
1993), 94. For a detailed discussion of the complex deliberations and machinations of the
Allies in the trucks-for-blood deal, see Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale? Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 172-95.
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Cairo exclaimed, "But Mr. Brand, what shall I do with those million Jews?
Where shall I put themT9)
Kastner resumed the trucks-for-blood negotiations after Brand's fiasco,
but to no avail. He continued to work with Eichmann's pliably corrupt
assistant Becher until almost the end of the war, and in June he succeeded
in bartering money and coffee for eighteen thousand Hungarian Jews, twothirds of whom lived out the war in Vienna. IO None too soon: when the Final
Solution ended in Hungary in July, just two months after it began, more
than four hundred thousand Hungarian Jews were dead.
Apparently, Kastner viewed all of his negotiations as a continuous heroic effort of rescue; taken as a group, they make the Noah's-ark deal seem
less exceptional and less suspicious. After the war Kastner moved to Israel, where he eventually became press spokesman for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and a Mapai Party candidate for the Knesset. The final
episode relevant to the Kastner trial occurred when Kastner testified on
behalf of Eichmann's assistant Becher at the latter's postwar denazification trial. Kastner's affidavit stated that Becher (a self-dealing conniver
whose specialty was financial extortion from desperate Hungarian Jews)
had saved 85,000 Jews. It went on:
There can be no doubt that Becher was one of the few SS It!aders who had
the courage to take a stand against the extermination program and who made
an attempt to save human lives .... Becher did everything he could, given his
position, to save innocent lives from the blind, murderous rampage of the Nazi
leadership. For this reason I never for a minute doubted his good intentions,
even if the form and basis for our negotiations were of an objectionable character."

The affidavit would return to haunt Kastner at his trial.
The trial itself, we should remember, was a libel action against the semicrank semi-journalist Malkhiel Gruenvald, who had accused Kastner of
collaboration with the Nazis, of conniving to save his own kinfolk and
favorites, of enriching himself, and of secretly defending Becher. Gruenvald's accusations threatened to embarrass Mapai, so the attorney general
(a Mapai member) pressured the reluctant Kastner into what is surely the
most improvident libel suit since Oscar Wilde.
GruenvaId was represented by an ambitious and talented right-wing law9. Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 728.
10. Ibid., 545.
II. Quoted in Segev, The Seventh Million, 269. Segev claims that Becher's help to the
Jews was merely an effort to create an alibi for himself, and Bauer reaches the same conclusion. Becher, who had substantial blood on his hands, lived out his years as a "respectable" multimillionaire bon vivant, with a taste for horseback riding and adultery.
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yer named Shmuel Tamir. Tamir's defense was quite straightforward: he
argued that Gruenvald had not libeled Kastner because the accusations were
true. And one of Tamir's coups was to find and produce in court Kastner's
affidavit in the Becher trial, after Kastner had testified that he had not really tried to help Becher.
After Kastner was caught out in that small, embarrassed semi-lie, things
only got worse. 12 Tamir produced as a witness Yoel Palgi, one of the daring Jewish paratroopers who had secretly dropped into Hungary on a mission of warning and resistance. '3 He testified that Kastner, fearful that their
presence would land the Hungarian Jews in trouble, persuaded Palgi and
a fellow paratrooper to tum themselves in to the Gestapo. Palgi eventually
escaped, but the other paratrooper perished. And Tamir got Palgi to admit
that he had lied about this incident earlier to cover for Kastner. 14 Judge
Halevi's initially favorable views began to tum increasingly against Kastner. Eventually, Halevi produced the opinion that forms the centerpiece of
Bilsky's essay-an opinion that Segev describes as "one ofthe most heartless in the history of Israel, perhaps the most heartless ever."15

III
The most important part of Halevi's opinion, which Bilsky so incisively
dissects, is this:
The temptation was great. K. was offered the opportunity to save six hundred
souls from the impending Holocaust. .. To rescue them would be both a personal achievement and a Zionist victory.... No wonder he accepted the offer without hesitation. But "timeo Danaos et donaferentis" [beware of Greeks
bearing gifts]. In accepting the offer, K. sold his soul to the devil. 16

Bilsky rightly treats this passage as the centerpiece of Halevi's opinion,
but we should not forget that his judgment turned on other findings as well.
Halevi found that Gruenvald had written the truth about Kastner's postwar
aid to Becher and that Kastner had lied about it on the stand. He dismissed
as irrelevant the evidence of the trucks-for-blood bargain, even though it
would have displayed the Noah's-ark deal in a more favorable light by
12. I am taking this account of the trial from Segev, The Seventh Million, 266-71.
13. The most famous of the paratroopers was the twenty-three-year-old poet and Israeli
national heroine Hannah Senesh, who was captured by the Nazis, tortured (bearing up with
legendary bravery and dignity), and executed.
14. Segev, The Seventh Million, 272.
IS. Ibid., 282.
16. Quoted in ibid., 282-83.
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showing that both were episodes in a continuing effort to save Jews, an
effort involving many people besides Kastner. On the basis of Palgi's testimony, Halevi held that Kastner double-crossed the paratroopers and,
again, that Kastner lied when he stated that he had done all he could to help
them. And Halevi held that Kastner had collaborated with the Nazis by
bargaining for blood with them.
So far as I can tell, Bilsky's analysis touches only the last of these findings, not the Becher or paratrooper findings, which themselves are quite
damaging to Kastner. Even if Halevi had not concluded that Kastner had
made a diabolical contract with Eichmann, he might well have found that
Kastner's behavior in the paratrooper episode-sabotaging their mission
to avoid trouble-amounted to collaboration. By neglecting the Becher and
paratrooper findings, I fear that Bilsky has moved Kastner into a whiter part
of the gray zone than he deserves.
Yet surely she is right that Judge Halevi's contract analysis, highlighted
by his image of Faustian bargains and Greek gifts, presupposes a condition of arm's-length business normalcy wholly absent from the catastrophic
world of terror and death that Kastner inhabited. A more telling case of
being blinded by a metaphor would be hard to find.

IV

In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt twice quotes Halevi's judgment that
Kastner sold his soul to the Devil. 17 But she does not have the legal imagery of contract on her mind. Rather, she sees in Kastner evidence for the
major theses of her own book.
The Eichmann book stirred a storm of controversy over two central theses. The first was that the Jewish leadership, the Jewish councils or "Judendite," had actively assisted the Nazis in peaceably rounding up the Jewsnot, to be sure, out of treachery, but out of the catastrophically false belief
that expediting the roundup would make it less cruel. In Arendt's eyes, the
leaders engaged in a kind of communal auto-euthanasia, behaving as if
extermination was inevitable and their sole responsibility was to make it
as painless as possible. Instead, the fact is that when the Jews did not actively aid their enemies, more of them survived, but when their leaders
organized their own deportation, most perished. Her second thesis is that
Eichmann's personality was not that of a sadist, a fanatic, an antisemite, a
monster, a Richard III, or-please note-a devil. Rather, he exhibits the
banality of evil. The Kastner affair sheds light on both theses.
17. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 42, 143.
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A reader who examines the dozen passages in Eichmann in Jerusalem
discussing Kastner quickly realizes that he is Arendt's poster child for the
sins of the Judenriite. (She either did not know or chose not to mention that
Kastner never belonged to a Judenrat.) She accepts Eichmann's improbable account of the Noah's-ark deal, namely that in return for some Jewish
lives Kastner promised to help keep the Hungarian Jews docile. IS And her
thesis could not be more condemnatory: "To a Jew this role of the Jewish
leaders in the destruction of their own people is undoubtedly the darkest
chapter of the whole dark story." Arendt expresses little doubt about their
motivations-"we can sense how they enjoyed their new power"-and
when she turns to Kastner "[t]he truth is even more gruesome." Why? Here
she focuses on his efforts to include prominent Jews and functionaries
among the 1684 destined for rescue. Analyzing what was "morally so disastrous in the acceptance of these privileged categories," she paraphrases
Kastner's thinking as follows: "it went without saying that a famous Jew
had more right to stay alive than an ordinary one."19
It went without saying because, of course, Kastner never said it. My
sense is that although Arendt may have been right about Kastner, her judgments outstrip what we actually know, which is precious little. No one ever
accused Arendt of impotentia judicandi, and there is no sign in Eichmann
in Jerusalem that she shares Levi's reluctance to judge anyone and everyone in the gray zone. To be sure, the language she scornfully quotes from
Kastner-that selecting who should live and who should perish "required
more courage than to face death"2°-is bathetic and self-serving, particularly coming from someone in comparative safety who was consigning
others to their deaths. But it also strikes me as the way that an egotistical
man (as Kastner apparently was 21 ) might phrase his authentic sense of awe
and inadequacy at the horrifying responsibility that had fallen his lot. Egotism is a vice, not a sin.
Arendt's merciless diagnosis of Kastner, seizing on his disagreeable
phraseology as part of her indictment of him, exemplifies one of Eichmann
in Jerusalem's central ideas: that in the "moral collapse the Nazis caused
in respectable European society"22 wickedness invariably came cloaked in
elevated phrases and orotund words. Arendt's method as a moral critic is
to rip through those words and plainly describe the reality they try to con18. Ibid., 42. However, elsewhere in the book, apparently without noticing the inconsistency, Arendt also accepts Kastner's version that the deal was a strict cash-for-lives trade.
Ibid., 143.
19. Ibid., 117, 118, 132.
20. Ibid., 132.
21. Bauer, Jews for Sale? 259.
22. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 125.
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ceal. Indeed, the central insight of the book, her diagnosis of Eichmann,
is. that he is a man whose inability to confront reality without resorting to
slogans and cliches rendered him incapable of thinking and therefore incapable of moral judgment. 23
This brings us to her treatment of Judge Halevi's image of Kastner selling his soul to the Devil. Astoundingly, Eichmann on the witness stand
praised Kastner as someone who (like Eichmann himself) would do anything for his ideals. Arendt comments with utmost sarcasm, "in Halevi's
opinion, Kastner had 'sold his soul to the devil.' Now that the devil himself was in the dock he turned out to be an 'idealist,' and though it may be
hard to believe, it is quite possible that the one who sold his soul had also
been an 'idealist. "'24
But of course what she really thinks is that Kastner had sold his soul,
not to the Devil, but to a mediocre bureaucrat whose every attempt at selfexplanation made him seem ridiculous: "everybody could see that [Eichmann] was not a 'monster,' but it was difficult indeed not to suspect that
he was a clown."25
And it is also difficult not to suspect that Halevi's metaphor was in the
forefront of Arendt's mind as she sat in the Jerusalem courtroom while the
very same Halevi presided over a trial in which Eichmann was testifying
about Kastner. If so, must she not have been thinking that Halevi, too, had
resorted to a grand-sounding but false phrase, referring to Eichmann as the
Devil when in fact he was not a devil, but a clown, and his bargaining
partner was not Dr. Faust, but Dr. Kastner? Her reflections on the Kastner
case may well represent the origins of her "banality of evil" idea. That idea,
I think, is one of the major moral discoveries of the twentieth century. For
all her insight, however, it is far from obvious that Arendt actually cared
whether she got Kastner right.

v
To Tom Segev as well, Kastner matters only as an episode within two larger
stories. The first, which Segev relates in great and depressing detail, is the
story of how the Zionists of Palestine, both Labor and Revisionist, responded to the Nazi crisis. The story, in brief, is that they viewed it almost en-

23. Ibid., 47-48. This central idea of the book was elaborated in her essay "Thinking and
Moral Considerations," Social Research 38 (1971): 417-46, perhaps her most important
contribution to moral theory.
24. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 42.
25. Ibid., 54.
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tirely from their own parochial political standpoints. Nothing expresses this
better than an amazing statement Segev quotes from Ben-Gurion: "If I knew
that it was possible to save all the children in Germany by transporting them
to England, but only half of them by transporting them to Palestine, I would
choose the second.... "26 Agents of both Labor Zionism and Revisionism
combed through Europe, looking for "the best human material" to rescue
(and trying to ensure that those they rescued would support the rescuer's
politics once they arrived in Palestine). A leader of the Rescue Committee, to which Kastner belonged, wrote a memorandum in 1943 that asked,
"Whom to save: ... Should we help everyone in need, without regard to
the quality of the people? Should we not give this activity a Zionist-national
character and try foremost to save those who can be of use to the Land of
Israel and to Jewry?"27
Viewed in this light, Kastner's careful gleaning ofthose 1684 Jews takes
on a different coloration than either Halevi or Arendt gives it. To Segev, it
represents something like the unofficial policy of the Zionist movement.
(Segev does not mention, however, that Kastner conscientiously included
virulently anti-Zionist Satmar Hasidim, and anti-Labor Revisionists, on the
Noah's-ark train.)28 It was, furthermore, a policy that both Labor and Revisionism indulged in. 29 But it took on a slightly more complex twist because Labor wanted to save those most committed to the pioneering spirit, while the Revisionists' constituency was largely the less politicized,
nonsocialist East European masses. For that reason, Revisionism's politicized selection criterion was to be unselective, to rescue as many as possible. This made the Revisionists look less elitist and more impartially humanitarian, but Segev stresses that their calculation was every bit as
political as that of Labor.
The latter point is important to the second part of Segev's story, the
politics of the trial itself. It was, in contemporary terms, not unlike the Paula
Jones case: right-wing lawyers trying to humiliate the left and, if possible,
to bring down the government. (It should be noted that the trial took place
in an election year.) Not only was Kastner a Labor stalwart, his actions
made a convenient symbol of what the right took to be Labor's orientation
toward rescue during the war. The Revisionists hated him-hated him

26. Quoted in Segev, The Seventh Million, 28. To be fair to Ben-Gurion, at the time he
made this statement (December 1938), almost no one actually believed that Hitler meant to
murder all the Jews. On the efforts of Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency to save Jews, even
at the cost of nation building in Palestine, see Bauer, Jews for Sale? 184, 188.
27. Quoted in Segev, The Seventh Million, 100.
28. Bauer, Jews for Sale? 199.
29. Segev, The Seventh Million, 40-45, 99-109.
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enough, in fact, to assassinate him shortly before he was exonerated on
appeal.
There is more. In order to show that Kastner's "collaboration" with the
Nazis had actually cost Jewish lives, Tamir argued that Kastner had deliberately withheld all he knew about Auschwitz and the Final Solution from
the Hungarian Jewish community in order to remain on Eichmann's good
side. Had he sounded the tocsin, Tamir intimated, the Jewish masses could
have fled or resisted. Kastner and the iudenriite had exhibited the typical
sniveling mentality of the exile, the very opposite of the tough and combative mentality of Israelis.30
Tamir's argument was based on two false assumptions: that the Hungarian Jews did not already know what the Nazis had in store for them, and
that had the Jews been warned they had opportunities to fight or flee. In
fact, many escapees and refugees had come to Hungary bearing news of
the Final Solution; the Hungarian Jews knew. The problem was that there
was no place to run and hide in the Hungarian plain, and no time to organize resistance. 31
According to Segev, Tamir's questionable argument played to a kind of
collective neurosis that prevented Israelis from acknowledging the Holocaust or admitting that they had been just as helpless as the European Jews
to do anything about it. Until the Eichmann trial in 1960, the Holocaust
was something that happened to them, the other kind of Jew, the grovelers
and connivers of the Diaspora. And Kastner's persecutors used the trial to
forge an association in the mind of the Israeli public between Kastner, the
Judenriite, the exile mentality, and Labor's policy toward rescue and immigration. It was a lethal mix.
But Segev's analysis of the politics of the Kastner trial has very little to
do with Kastner himself. Although he never states his own view of Kastner explicitly, Segev makes it clear that he sympathasizes with the appellate opinion that cleared Kastner. He does not, however, say why. His point
is basically that Kastner had only been doing what Zionist functionaries
across the political spectrum did-compromise, rescue, and select on the
basis of their movement's needs.
30. On this theme in the Kastner trial, see Asher Maoz, "Historical Adjudication: Courts
of Law, Commissions of Inquiry, and 'Historical Truth,'" Law and History Review 18 (2000):

598-99.
Notice that Tamir's is a different accusation against the Judenriite than Arendt's. She never
indulged in Tamir's fantasy that the Jews might have fled or resisted, and in fact she argued
that to accuse them of going like lambs to the slaughter is merely cruel. Her point was not
that the Judenriite undermined resistance, but that they actively, if unwittingly, facilitated
slaughter.
31. Bauer convincingly refutes all Tamir's assumptions; see Jews for Sale? 150-61.
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VI
What shall we say of Justice Agranat's opinion, which (as Bilsky analyzes it), subsumes the Kastner case to the categories of administrative law,
asking whether Kastner discharged his responsibilities reasonably under the
circumstances? Here, the guiding metaphor is not the private law of contract, but the public law requiring officials to balance the risks and benefits
of their policies in a reasonable way, given the information available to them
when they decide.
One problem with this analysis is that Kastner was not a public official
and had no political mandate for engaging in utilitarian calculation involving the lives of the community. A bigger problem is that the whole question of what is reasonable under such insane circumstances, what counts
as an appropriate weighing of risks and benefits, seems profoundly unanswerable. The trucks-for-blood negotiation is unimaginable, even after we
somehow get over the threshold insanity of bartering trucks for blood. Did
Eichmann (or Himmler, who masterminded the deal) actually think that
Brand or Kastner could get the Allies to give ten thousand trucks to Germany during the thick of the war? Could Himmler have believed Nazi propaganda about the cabalistic power of World Jewry over the highest counsels of the West? Did Kastner believe it?32 Did Himmler believe that the
West was fighting the war solely on behalf of the Jews and would jump at
the chance to save them?33 Did he think that by assuring the Western allies that the trucks would be used only on the eastern front, he would excite their anticommunism? Did he actually want the Allies to reject the deal
so that they, too, would have Jewish blood on their hands-or so that they
would be placed in the perverse position of ratifying the Nazi view that
Jewish lives count for nothing?34
For that matter, did Eichmann or Himmler think that they had the authority to release a million Hungarian Jews in return for the trucks? Even
though the Fuhrer valued Jewish lives at less than zero, Eichmann and
Himrnler knew only too well that he placed an enormous value on Jewish
deaths. Why think that Hitler would relinquish them?
All these questions about the motivations of Eichmann and his superiors must have been going through the minds of Brand and Kastner. Even
in the upside-down universe they inhabited, how could they have divorced
themselves from the realization that the negotiation was entirely imaginary?
32. According to Bauer, the answer is yes, although Brand was never under any similar
illusions. See Bauer, Jews for Sale? 170.
33. Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 544.
34. On this motivation, see Bauer, Jews for Sale? 167, 178, 186.
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Did Kastner decide reasonably? On the one side lies the certain moral
wrong of trying to deliver war materiel to the Nazis and of trafficking with
murderers for months. On the other lies the gamble: a minuscule probability of saving a great number of Jews. Risk-benefit calculation is at its
most dubious in "zero-infinity dilemmas," when probabilities are tiny and
consequences enormous-that is why there is no such thing as an objectively reasonable price for a high-stakes, one-in-ten-million chance Lotto
ticket. In such cases calculation is only a caricature of rationality. Yet a zeroinfinity dilemma is precisely the gamble that Kastner anted in to at the cost
of morally clean hands. For that reason it is deeply unc:lear that Justice
Agranat was entitled to conclude that Kastner acted reasonably. Recall
Levi's imagery: the reasonableness of Kastner's decision evades our judgment, just as a compass goes wild at the magnetic pole. Bilsky has not
persuaded me that the metaphor of administrative law is less misleading
than Judge Halevi's metaphor of private contract. How can we speak of
reasonable choice in circumstances where no choice is reasonable? Agranat
was surely correct that Kastner did not act treacherously, but that conclusion has little if anything to do with administrative law.

VII

Near the end of her article, Bilsky paints her own portrait of Kastner. For
her, the sheer grandiosity of the plan to save a million Jews explains why
Kastner found the gamble appealing. "Kastner was a Zionist committed to
... activism, self-help, and self-assertion .... [A]s a Zionist, Kastner did
not see himself limited to conventional ways of action ... and was willing to try radical action such as negotiations with the Nazis over fantastic
plans such as the 'blood for trucks' idea .... Kastner was not of the passive brand .... "35
In other words, Kastner's actions can be explained by the fact that he
had the opposite of the exile mentality that his persecutors and Judge Halevi tagged him with. Nor was he as feckless as Arendt painted him. On
the contrary: he was bold and resourceful, a visionary, unconventional,
"can-do" Zionist Zorro. According to Bilsky'S interpretation, Justice
Agranat's opinion, insisting that a judge put himself in Kastner's shoes and
Kastner's mentality, recognizes that a high-stakes gamble might be reasonable for such a man under the circumstances.
Perhaps Bilsky is right; but, like Arendt's opinion in the opposite direction, it seems to me to overstep the evidence. Bilsky's portrait of Kastner
35. Bilsky, "Judging Evil," 154-55.
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does not readily square with Eichmann's testimony that Kastner offered to
help pacify the Hungarian Jews in return for 1684 lives (perhaps Bilsky
thinks Eichmann was lying, or that Kastner was just buying time); nor with
Kastner's self-serving selection of his relatives and people from his hometown for the Noah's-ark train; nor with Kastner urging the two paratroopers to tum themselves in; nor with Kastner's efforts on Becher's behalf after
the war. 36
Levi doesn't call it the gray zone for nothing.

IX
"From many signs," Levi writes,
it would seem the time has come to explore the space which separates ... the
victims from the persecutors, and to do so with a lighter hand, and with a less
turbid spirit than has been done .... Only a schematic rhetoric can claim that
that space is empty: it never is, it is studded with obscene or pathetic figures
(sometimes they possess both qualities simultaneously) whom it is indispensable to know if we want to know the human species ....

Was Kastner obscene or pathetic? Was he reasonable or heroic? Even after reading the insight-studded treatments of Kastner by Bilsky, Arendt,
Segev, and Bauer, it seems to me impossible to answer these questions. In
that case, how should a court of law have treated him and his accuser
Gruenvald? Here I will tum to Levi for the last time: "The condition of the
offended does not exclude culpability, which is often objectively serious,
but I know of no human tribunal to which one could delegate the judgment."3?
If Levi is right, no court should have been placed in the position of condemning or exonerating Kastner-but, of course, the libel action and
Shmuel Tamir's truth-defense left no room for the passive virtues: the court
must either accept the truth of Gruenvald's accusations or reject them. 38 It
seems that whatever illumination we seek of the gray zone must come from
36. Why did Kastner help Becher? His accusers intimated that it was to buy Becher's silence, while Segev quotes a friend of Kastner's who believed that Kastner wanted to experience one more time the power over life and death. See Segev, The Seventh Million, 268.
Bauer believes that Kastner simply thought Becher deserved help because he had helped to
save lives. See Bauer, Jews for Sale? 250. I suspect Kastner had to believe that Becher was
a worthy partner in order to believe that he himself played an honorable role working with
'him.
37. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 40, 44.
38. As Maoz explains, this point was made in Justice Goitein's opinion in the Kastner
appeal. See Maoz, "Historical Adjudication," 593-94.
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elsewhere than the law. For Arendt, it comes from her theories of politics
and moral psychology; for Segev, from his understanding of Zionist politics; for Kastner's enemies, from the contempt they felt for the mentality
of the exile and their Labor adversaries; for Bilsky, from her idea of what
is reasonable for a bold Zionist rescuer. Unfortunately, it may no longer
be Kastner that is illuminated.
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